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Drawing on comparative case studies, this article critiques the positioning of accountability as 
a benign and straightforward governance function. From a critical management studies 
perspective, I offer a conceptualization of the relationship between governance and 
accountability in which issues of power, beliefs about the nature of organizing and social 
relations are integral features. The paper clarifies how principal-agent governance 
assumptions, based on a central logic of unitarism, can drive narrow compliance-based 
interpretations of accountability. Such an approach appears at odds with the values embedded 
in the social missions of many non-profits in so far as they prioritize small sections of 
powerful stakeholders over sustained periods of time. Conversely, a pluralist logic appears to 
create space for broad accountability to multiple stakeholders. Here, expressive, values-based 
accountability is seen as a source of legitimacy and can produce complex relationships, which 
challenge the instrumental orientation to social relations that principal-agent theories assume. 
 
Numerous governance theories – including agency and stewardship theory – address 
principal-agent relationships (Tosi et al., 2003; Caers et al., 2006; Hernandez, 2012). Essentially, 
such relationships explain the behavior of actors within a hierarchical order in so far as agents are 
expected to act on behalf of principals and in pursuit of principals’ interests above their own. While 
some scholars have questioned the foundations and applicability of principal-agent governance 
theories to non-profit governance (see Cornforth, 2004; Steinberg, 2010), such theories remain 
popular as a way to explain relations between organizational actors within non-profits and between 
non-profits and external stakeholders (see Olson, 2000; Caers et al., 2006; de Andrés-Alonso et al., 
2009).  
This paper adopts a critical management studies perspective, which generally involves 
skepticism about the moral defensibility and social sustainability of dominant models of 
organization (Adler et al., 2007). Viewed through this frame, consideration is given to how different 
governance theories shed light on the prioritization and marginalization of internal and external 
accountability relations. It is posited that agency, stewardship, democratic and stakeholder theory 
are useful lenses to expose implicit assumptions about the nature of work and organization, which 
have significant implications for forms and processes of accountability. Specifically, I address the 
question, ‘what implications are there for the nature of accountability in a range of governance 
theories and their associated practices?’  
The article takes the following form. First, I review the extant literature surrounding theories 
of corporate governance and their implications for non-profit accountability. Second, the 
comparative case study methods and organizations are outlined in the second section. The third 
section presents and discusses key case study findings, exposing how – often tacit – assumptions 
about the nature of work organizations act to shape governance practices and constructs of 
accountability within non-profits. The orientation of the four cases is explored to compare and 
contrast prevailing unitary and pluralist logics to governance and accountability. The fourth section 
concludes the paper. 
1 Theories of Corporate Governance: Assumptions about Work Organizations and 
Accountability 
Governance is of central concern to non-profits, yet theories of nonprofit governance are 
underdeveloped in comparison with corporate governance (Cornforth, 2004; 2012). Morrison & 
Salipante (2007) specifically suggest that knowledge of governance practices to achieve broadened 
accountability to multiple and diverse stakeholder groups has lagged. To develop arguments in the 
spirit of critical inquiry, this section aims to expose and question the assumptions and asymmetrical 
power relations that are often taken for granted in particular governance theories. In doing so I 
challenge the notion of accountability as a somewhat benign and straightforward governance 
function and recast it as a challenging, complex choice. 
Drawing on insights from institutional theory, I argue that different perspectives on 
governance are founded on distinct logics. Fundamentally, these logics constitute organizing 
principles based upon a set of belief systems and associated practices (Friedland & Alford 1991; 
Scott, 2001). One of the rudiments linking principal-agent theories such as agency and stewardship 
theory is that they are founded on what Watson (2006) refers to as a ‘systems-control’ approach to 
framing organizational realities. Essentially these approaches aspire to maximize control over 
human circumstances by presenting organizations as goal-based controllable systems. The central 
logic is thus one of unitarism; a perspective built on the assumption that everyone – employees, 
beneficiaries and the wider community – will benefit from decisions made at a senior level:  
 “As regards the role of the CEO, structures will assist them to attain superior 
performance by their corporations to the extent that [they] exercise complete authority 
over the corporation and that their role is unambiguous and unchallenged… the 
organization will enjoy the classic benefits of unity of direction and of strong command 
and control.” (Donaldson & Davis, 1991 pp. 51-52)     
There are, however, departures between agency and stewardship theory in the assumed 
interests of principals and agents, which hold implications for associated governance practices, that 
are worth attention here. Within agency theory assumptions, people are individualistic and 
motivated by self-interest (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003), there is goal conflict between principals 
and agents, and agents will not always act in the interests of principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Here, a core organizing principle is that the board should ensure conformance through: safeguarding 
founders’ interests, overseeing management and checking compliance within a principal-agent 
relationship (Cornforth, 2004; Letza et al., 2008). The board’s role is thus to control or constrain the 
behavior of agents in order that they conform to principals’ii interests. Much attention within this 
tradition is therefore given to motivating agents to act in the interests of principals through selection 
policies and processes, monitoring and pay incentives for example (Davis et al., 1997; Tosi et al., 
2003; Besley & Ghatak, 2005). 
In contrast, stewardship theory (see Barney, 1990) assumes board members and managers 
either share interests (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) or that agents will at least be motivated to act 
in the interests of principals even in the presence of goal conflict (Davis et al., 1997). The approach 
is thus based on CEO-board partnership (Block, 1998), with some proponents of stewardship theory 
advocating CEO duality where the CEO acts simultaneously as chair of the board (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). Here, board members are often ‘experts’ whose role is to add value to top-level 
decision and strategy making (Cornforth, 2004). The CEO under this theory is not an opportunistic 
shirker and essentially wants to do a good job by being an effective steward of the assets (Caers et 
al., 2006). While some stewardship scholars take a broad view, acknowledging the interests of 
groups that extend to the broader community, the degree of this ‘prosocial’ behavior appears 
dependent upon manager’s conceptions of beneficiaries, their emotional connection to beneficiary 
groups and their willingness to protect beneficiaries’ interests (Hernandez, 2012). In this sense, 
power and control is retained by organizational elites.       
Within the logic of unitarism, conflicting objectives are seen as dysfunctional and agents’ 
accountability to principals takes precedence and is enacted through adherence to monitoring, 
accounting and auditing and the law (Davis et al., 1997; Sternberg, 1997; Jegers, 2008). Roberts 
(2001 p.1547) argues that such formal hierarchical accountability creates “a sense of self as singular 
and solitary within only an external and instrumental relationship to others.” Here, we can draw 
parallels with narrow constructs of accountability presented in the non-profit literature where the 
relationship between non-profits and their evaluators constitutes a typical principal-agent 
relationship founded on instrumental, rule-based accountability involving explicit and objective 
standards of assessment (Morrison & Salipante, 2007; Knutsen & Brower, 2010). Indeed, Sternberg 
(1997) argues that accountability is only legitimate in circumstances where principals have the 
authority to hold agents to account and attacks stakeholder theory for “destroying” conventional 
accountability. In short, she posits that just because organizations are affected by and affect certain 
factors, such as the environment, does not mean they are accountable to them. Principal-agent 
theories thus cast accountability as “the means by which individuals and organizations report to a 
recognized authority and are held responsible for their actions” (Edwards & Hulme, 1996 p. 967). 
This may act to marginalize broader constructs of accountability based on ‘felt responsibility’ or 
taking responsibility for one’s own actions (Cornwall et al. 2000 p.3), which would be central to 
critical management endeavors and their deliberate attempts to enhance empowerment and the 
voices of the less powerful.  
Such broad notions of accountability have been debated extensively in the non-profit 
literature, not least due to the notion that non-profits will be driven by ‘expressive’ forms of 
accountability involving self-perceptions of their community roles and mission (Knutsen & Brower, 
2010). Relations founded upon expressive or felt accountability are thus values-driven and 
negotiated, often based upon implicit, subjective standards of assessment (Morrison & Salipante, 
2007); no external evaluator directly demands these accountabilities and there is no hierarchical 
authority. This approach is not unique to the non-profit sector, however. Governance theories such 
as stakeholder and democratic theory were developed in the corporate governance literature, 
directly challenging the foundations of unitary, principal-agent theories. One of the key purposes of 
this challenge was to extend companies’ responsibilities beyond those enshrined in law, which are 
often premised on minimal standards (Vinten, 2001).  
Stakeholder and democratic theory are thus driven by what Watson (2006) terms a ‘process-
relational’ view of work and organizations, characterized by the acceptance of multiple individuals 
and groups with divergent interests and priorities, requiring “continuous social, political… and 
moral processes” (Watson, 2006 p.52).  The central logic is one of pluralism, where diverse groups’ 
pursuit of disparate interests can produce conflict (Darwin et al., 2002), which is considered both 
inevitable and a possible driver of social transformation (Fox, 1966). There are, however, 
differences between the practices associated with stakeholder and democratic theory, which I will 
briefly draw out.  
Stakeholder theory assumes stakeholders have different interests and it is therefore important 
that the governing board is made up of stakeholder representatives (Kochan & Rubinstein, 2000); 
there is a focus on how specific stakeholder groups exercise oversight and control over 
management. A core conviction is that organizations have more extensive duties to key stakeholder 
groups than is strictly required by law (Gibson, 2000). Vinten (2001) defines the stakeholder 
corporation as one which not only recognizes its direct legal and statutory responsibilities, but its 
need for a ‘license to operate’ and responsibilities to those indirectly affected by its activities and 
decisions.   
Democratic theory is built on the premise that organization actors and the public have 
different interests and that democratic political order allows for protection of individual 
liberties/rights against the potentially corrupt and tyrannical power of the state (Moravcsik, 2004). 
Under this theory, good governance begins with implementing traditional democratic structures and 
focuses on the process through which decisions are made as a source of legitimacy (Dahl, 1999). 
Indeed, Gomez & Korine (2008) argue that all corporations must take into consideration society’s 
views on what constitutes a legitimate exercise of power based on the view that directors cannot 
govern the corporation in opposition to the values of the society in which the organization is 
embedded. 
The board’s role under a pluralist logic is thus political: to represent diversity of interests and 
balance stakeholder needs, to make policy and to control management (Cornforth, 2004). Indeed, 
those who address the underlying philosophical and relational issues in corporate governance argue 
that it is a social and dynamic process, rather than an economic, fixed and enduring ‘reality’ and 
therefore must be considered in relation to concepts of politics, power, culture, ideologies, modes of 
thought and social relations (Letza and Sun, 2004). Stakeholder and democratic theories require 
corporations to move beyond their legal and statutory responsibilities and this immediately 
broadens the scope of accountability, constructing it as a combination of being “held responsible” 
by external actors and “taking responsibility” for one’s own actions (Cornwall et al., 2000 p.3).  
Roberts (2001 p.1547) posits that “socializing forms of accountability… constitute a sense of 
the interdependence of self and other, both instrumental and moral.” Similarly, in a non-profit 
context, commentators have suggested that staff, volunteers and trustees can require both 
instrumental and expressive accountability (Knutsen & Brower, 2010). As resource suppliers, these 
groups can expect returns for their contribution to the organization through implementation of 
human resource management legislation and practices, or networking opportunities for self-
interested purposes (Morrison & Salpiante, 2007; Knutsen & Brower, 2010). In addition, 
organizational actors may expect their treatment will honor the moral and social values the 
organization projects in its service work (Jeavons, 1992). This requires expressive, values-driven 
forms of accountability and this increases its complexity as organizations move away from rule-
based accountability involving explicit and objectified standards of assessment towards implicit, 
subjective standards of assessment where no external evaluator directly demands accountability 
(Morrison & Salipante, 2007). 
The theories reviewed thus represent distinct schools of thought on corporate governance, 
which are infused with particular and sometimes opposing assumptions about the nature of work 
and organization. This holds major implications for the treatment of stakeholders and the construct 
of accountability. Table 1 provides a summary of and integrates the key concepts evoked within the 
literature review.  
[Table 1 here] 
In a non-profit context, principal-agent assumptions, and the instrumental forms of 
accountability associated with them, can be problematic. This is particularly the case where non-
profits are motivated to adopt alternative, democratic forms of organization in line with the societal 
change they aim to bring about and/or legitimacy in the eyes of the non-profit’s host society is 
central to organizational viability. It is difficult to conceive of an environmental non-profit, for 
example, maintaining legitimacy if it did not account for its own impact on the ozone layer or 
natural environment simply because these factors are “not the sorts of things that can hold agents to 
account” (Sternberg, 1997 p.6).  
2 Methods 
A grounded, interpretive approach to comparative case analysis is used to answer the research 
question about the implications of particular governance theories and their associated practices for 
the nature of accountability. Such an approach builds on understanding the experiences of non-
profit actors, rather than imposing a predetermined framework. Fieldwork included collection of 
different types of qualitative data from multiple sources across four non-profits in England. 
Engagement with theories of corporate governance and their implications for non-profit 
accountability took place following data collection through recursive cycling between data, 
emerging theory and extant literature. 
The data presented here constitutes part of a wider program of research, incorporating five 
focus groups and an exploratory survey of 400 non-profits. The four cases discussed were chosen 
based on their potential to shed light on my area of theoretical interest in relation to governance and 
accountability processes. Specifically, they highlighted challenges pertaining to relational dynamics 
(for example, between staff and trustees or between the non-profit and statutory agencies) within 
the earlier exploratory survey. Additionally, cases were selected to represent a range of 
organizational forms and purposes (including membership, advocacy and service organizations and 
a museum), adopting a variety of governance structures and practices.  Table 2 provides a summary 
of the four organizations. 
[Table 2 here] 
Table 2 illustrates that the cases are heterogeneous with respect to their fields of work, income 
profile, level and nature of human resources, constitutional requirements for board composition and 
scale of operation. Yet the cases are homogeneous with respect to funding levels and non-
unionization. It should be noted that the purpose of case selection is not to establish causal 
explanations for particular governance and accountability approaches, based on variables such as 
organizational size, field of work, scale of operation etc. Rather, they illustrate how different 
governance assumptions and practices can be seen to produce different accountability forms and 
processes. The relationship between these processes and specific organization forms and purposes 
are considered later in this paper.   
2.1 DATA SOURCES 
Fieldwork with the four organizations took place over a six-month period and data was 
collected from three main sources: 
1. Interviews. Twenty-three interviews were undertaken with three categories of actors: board 
members, CEOs and staff. Seven interviews took place with board members (one from case A; 
three from case B; one from C; and two from D), four with CEOs (one from each case) and 
twelve with staff from various hierarchical levels (three from case A; two from case B; three 
from C; and four from D). Early interviews were largely investigative and resulted in emergent 
themes that were pursued in subsequent interviews. Interviews with non-profit actors lasted 
between 40 and 120 minutes and had four foci:  
▪ governance structures, processes and challenges  
▪ the nature of relations between staff, volunteers and trustees 
▪ the nature of inter-organizational relations and/or collaborative efforts 
▪ how such relational dynamics affect decision-making and the setting and safeguarding of 
mission and values. 
2. Documents. Four categories of information were consulted in the fieldwork period: 
business/strategic plans; annual reports and accounts; minutes of board meetings; and 
promotional material. This allowed corroboration of interview material with formal text.  
3. Observations. During field visits observations of organization activities were recorded in a field 
diary. This involved the observation of a board meeting at case A, informal coffee breaks 
involving all staff at cases B, C and D and at least one day of observing general daily activities 
at each case. Although these observations are not featured in this paper, they provided a useful 
context to aid understanding and theoretical development.  
2.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
My analysis followed established procedures for grounded approaches to theory building 
across multiple organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1984). It consisted of a series 
of steps, the first of which involved the coding of transcripts and documents for each organization. 
These codes comprised phrases, terms or descriptions, all revolving around the nature and dynamics 
of governance and accountability. Such descriptions included, for example, comments on honoring 
the organization’s original purpose, stories of the organization’s founding era, narrations of the 
importance of meeting legislative requirements, developing policies and procedures or involving 
service users. These formed first level codes, which were constantly compared across documents 
for possible conceptual patterns within each case. 
The second step of the analysis involved looking for codes across interviews and documents 
that could be grouped into higher-level themes. For example, comments on founding eras and 
honoring the original purpose could be grouped under “Elevation of organizational history to 
socialize employees into sharing leaders’ beliefs, assumptions and vision for the organization”, 
forming a set of first-order categories. Importantly, a key analytical task in this and all subsequent 
steps was to juxtapose cases against each other for searching for similarities and differences.  
The third step developed links among first-order categories in order to develop theoretically 
distinct clusters through a recursive process. For example, categories containing instances of actors 
emphasizing (a) the development of policies and procedures to control work, (b) conflict as 
illegitimate and/or dysfunctional and (c) organization history to socialize employees into sharing 
leaders’ visions were collapsed into a theme called “control and conflict”.  
The fourth step involved organizing these themes into dimensions that eventually provided a 
basis for theorizing. The first theme is the logic of unitarism as a driver of narrow, compliance-
based accountability; the second emphasizes pluralist logics as a driver of broad, expressive forms 
of accountability. Steps 2, 3 and 4, and the links between them, are depicted in Figure 1.   
[Figure 1 here] 
3 Findings and Analysis 
In order to frame the empirical findings and address the question of what implications exist 
for accountability in various governance theories and practices, Table 3 delineates the potential 
consequences of diverse governance assumptions for the nature of accountability in non-profit 
organizations. Specifically, the implications of the governance theories foreshadowed in the 
literature review are linked to board composition and role, board-staff interests and the subsequent 
focus and nature of accountability relations. It should be noted, however, that practitioners do not 
necessarily operate consistently within a particular stance and often vary their approach within a 
specific context. Rather than claiming the taxonomy presented is exhaustive, I would point to its 
heuristic value that exposes the possibility of diverse views of governance and accountability, thus 
illustrating the range of choices available to non-profit practitioners.  
[Table 3 here] 
  Section 3 proceeds by discussing the analysis underpinning development of the above 
typology. 
3.1 Unitary Theories of Governance and Conceptions of Accountability 
This sub-section illustrates how agency and stewardship governance assumptions, based on a 
unitary logic, can produce particular effects on the nature of accountability. First, however, it is 
important to highlight the distinguishing features, which suggest the central logic of case A and B to 
be unitary (see Table 4).   
[Table 4 here] 
Both cases appear to be united by overarching unitary logics, where the goal for organization 
is harmonious, consensual entities that exist for common purposes. There are, however, differences 
in how they pursue this goal. Case A largely appears to operate within agency governance 
assumptions where relationships are viewed as nothing more than a series of implicit and explicit 
contracts with associated rights (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Within such contracts, a key challenge 
is how to ensure agents will act in the best interests of principals (Turnbull, 1997). Within case A, 
the board – made up of long serving members – assumes its role in the monitoring and control of 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in order to limit any divergence from their interests: “In terms of 
the board, it’s our job to make sure the CEO is properly monitored. I see him fortnightly for an 
hour, hour and a half, see he’s doing the job and I’m just trying to help him by holding him 
accountable” (Chair).  
In contrast, Case B seems to adopt a partnership approach between CEO and board, indicating 
parallels with stewardship governance assumptions and the associated adoption of CEO duality 
(Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Though UK charity law generally prevents it, organization B developed 
complex structures to allow the CEO to act as a trustee; the CEO simultaneously holds the position 
of Honorary (unpaid) Museum Director of the charity and Chief Executive of the wholly owned 
trading subsidiary, for which he is remunerated. The board obtained an Order from the Charity 
Commission to enable him to continue to be a trustee of the charity when he took on the role as 
CEO of the trading subsidiary. Despite a collectivized approach between board and CEO, however, 
the CEO exercises complete authority over the organization and his role is unambiguous and 
unchallenged by staff, thereby suggesting adoption of a unitary logic (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
Although interpretation of the data signals case A and B start from opposite assumptions 
regarding the interests of the board (as principals) and CEO (as agent), they share the idea that 
control emanates from the top of the organization where elites rule: “You have, as Trustees, people 
who are eminent in their professions and skilled.. that’s where the expertise comes from.  It’s 
assumed they’re capable and expert and they sit on the Trustees, showing their wisdom.” (Chair, 
case A). Thus, considering the relationship between board and staff more widely appears to 
illustrate that agents’ accountability to principals takes precedence and is enacted through adherence 
to monitoring and implementation of HR legislation, policies and procedures. Accountability thus 
acts as a constraint upon an opportunistic and self-interested human nature (Roberts, 2001). Roberts 
argues that such processes and practices of accountability create individualizing effects, which are 
associated with formal hierarchal accountability, and drive development of instrumental 
relationships. The associated monitoring and organization surveillance takes place within formal 
hierarchical accountability and, arguably, creates disciplinary effects (Rose, 1989) and processes 
that attempt to prevent circumvention of formal hierarchy. 
At an informal level, there seems to be an attempt to “build strong cultures” where employees 
share their leader’s beliefs, assumptions, and vision for the organization (Martin, 2002, p. 8). Case 
A’s employees are socialized with the founding story of a visionary faith leader who identified the 
need and established provision for “the needy”, while within case B there is constant reference to 
the historical military links of the museum and maintaining an authoritarian approach consistent 
with that tradition. In each case, the historical roots of the organization are used to legitimize the 
authority of a select group of leaders (principals) over a group of subordinate followers (agents) and 
to ensure the principal’s goals are accepted as natural, unchallengeable and given. Table 5 illustrates 
the various ways in which cases A and B reinforce instrumental accountability within internal 
relations. 
[Table 5 here] 
Within such contexts, the construct of instrumental relationships at the individual level seems to 
reproduce at the organizational level, leading to the prioritization of instrumental, transactional 
relationships to external stakeholders. Roberts (2001) argues that dominance of external market 
mechanisms contributes to producing such forms of accountability and it is noteworthy that case B 
has the highest level of earned income and is run as “an attraction business”, while case A has the 
second highest proportion of earned income – albeit marginally – with the ambition to increase this 
type of income. Within both cases, references to “professionalization”, “amateurism” and 
“business” are prevalent within the narratives of senior organizational actors and compliance with 
legal and regulatory obligations seems to take priority. External stakeholders who lack the authority 
to bring about sanctions, such as service users, appear marginalized in decision-making processes in 
favor of viewing them as customers or consumers of services. Moreover, donors and other players 
in the external environment are looked upon as an instrumental resource to further the goals set by 
the organizations’ elite (see Table 6).  
[Table 6 here] 
My analysis indicates that if missions, visions and goals are developed and governed solely 
by organization elites, it is their perspectives that become prioritized and legitimized at the 
organization level. Prioritization of principals’ interests is not considered a problem if principals’ 
appointments are assumed to be based on merit. They are assumed to be the rightful guardians of 
the overall purpose of the organization, that is pursued in the best interests of all members, whether 
they realize it or not (Johnson & Gill, 1993). As Table 4 suggests, rationality is “automatically 
accorded to decision making of the leadership and the behavior of subordinates who might be 
recalcitrant or even resistant to such direction becomes deemed to be irrational” (McAuley et al. 
2007 p.15). I find that in this situation, broader conceptions of expressive accountability based on 
moral foundations often can be marginalized in favor of narrow conceptions of hierarchical 
accountability within instrumental principal-agent relationships. By conceptualizing accountability 
in this way, the priorities of the majority of organization members and wider community 
stakeholders who are affected by the organization’s operation may be marginalized or excluded. 
Moreover, this narrow instrumental view of human nature can appear at odds with the values 
embedded in the social mission of many non-profit organizations. 
3.2 Pluralist Governance Theories and Accountability 
Before contrasting the above governance approaches and their accountability implications 
with democratic and stakeholder governance assumptions, Table 7 evokes the central logic of case 
C and D as pluralist.   
[Table 7 here] 
Though cases C and D appear to be founded upon pluralist logics, where organizations are 
constituted by diverse groups who pursue disparate interests, there are subtle but important 
differences which deserve attention. Case C seems to operate under the premise that to prevent the 
organization from adversely affecting stakeholders it requires governance processes that allow 
stakeholders to participate in decision-making. In a practical sense, this plays out formally through 
the election of trustees by case C’s membership and the co-option of other board members, 
representing statutory agencies, to ensure a sufficiently wide representation of stakeholder interest 
groups. The board, in turn, charges the CEO with the responsibility of stakeholder involvement in 
wider organizational endeavors: “The trustees usually give me a steer… a recent issue has been to 
what extent we build relationships with the private sector and how that is presented to members; we 
will also not compete to provide any service that our members could provide. The general 
instruction I have from the trustees is that we want people in the tent rather than outside the tent and 
we should work to accommodate what they want” (CEO).  
Case D appears strongly driven by the principles of democratic theory, built on the protection 
of individual liberties and rights (Moravcsik, 2004). Such ideological foundations are endemic in 
both the formal charitable objects of the organization, which talks of helping a particular section of 
society “obtain their full rights and privileges”, and its processes and practices:  
“Because we go about changing things outside of the organization, it’s really important 
that we change things within the organization. We don’t just accept how things ‘should’ 
be; we’re always trying to change things and that thing about the process is really 
important… if we don’t get the process right then the end result is never right” (CEO).  
Despite maintaining a structural separation of board and staff, a requirement of UK charity 
law and also often a strategy to reassure funders, regulators and other interest groups (Turnbull, 
1997), the reality of organization life is very different. Much value, for example, is placed on 
locating decisions in democratic discourse (see dimension 3, Table 7), perhaps based on the 
recognition that transactions are “conducted on the basis of mutual trust and confidence sustained 
by… mutually obligated and legally non-enforceable relationships” (Hollingsworth et al., 1994 p.6). 
It is particularly notable that there is an element of ‘self-governance’ as appointment of trustees is 
conditional on prospective board members spending time with and receiving ‘approval’ from the 
‘governed’ who are, in turn, often people with disabilities.        
Despite these differences, actors within both organizations arguably display skepticism about 
the moral defensibility of dominant models of management and organization (Adler et al., 2007) 
and the automatic rights of organizational elites’ to govern and manage (Johnson & Gill, 1993). I 
find that such an approach often leads cases C and D to go beyond instrumental, hierarchical forms 
of accountability to a broader, expressive view of accountability involving ongoing social, political 
and moral processes (Watson, 2006) between internal groups. Roberts (2001) posits that such 
processes and practices of accountability create socializing effects often involving face-to-face 
accountability between people of relatively equal power, in a cultural if not structural sense. The 
ability of trustees and managers to pursue organizational strategy in this context seems to require 
account to be taken of employees’ perceptions of its legitimacy. Table 8 suggests various ways in 
which case C and D reinforce expressive accountability within internal relations. 
[Table 8 here] 
Within such contexts, the view that social relations involves moral, ethical and political 
processes is also applied to relationships with  external stakeholders. Here, the focus moves beyond 
instrumental, upward accountability to those who have the authority to hold the organization 
accountable and can take on expressive forms based upon sets of relationships and understandings 
of community roles and mission (see Table 9).  
[Table 9 here] 
From the perspective of cases C and D, organizations appear to be viewed as social 
collectives, where, “through critique, reflection, debate and the development of democratic 
relations, the status quo might be challenged and alternative forms of organization developed that 
express the perceived interests of those currently excluded from a say in how organizations are 
organized.” (McAuley et al., 2007 p.26). Such practices challenge a narrow view of accountability 
relations within and between organizations and their stakeholders as essentially instrumental and 
instead construct them as a potential source of legitimacy. This broad view of accountability, 
however, would come under attacked by those who adopt the assumptions of principal-agent 
relations as the ‘best’ way to organize. Here, the only legitimate form of accountability is to those 
who have the (legal) authority to hold agents to account (Sternberg, 1997). 
4 Concluding Remarks  
While theorization of corporate governance has become increasingly sophisticated, theories of 
non-profit governance are comparatively under developed (Cornforth, 2004; 2012). In the context 
of this paper, advances have been made regarding the effects of particular systems of governance on 
processes of accountability within the corporate domain (see Roberts, 2001). In the non-profit 
arena, however, theoretical developments surrounding the nature of accountability transcend 
understanding of non-profit governance. In particular, understanding of governance to achieve 
broad accountability – as called for by numerous non-profit scholars – has lagged (Morrison & 
Salipante, 2007). Drawing on multiple governance theories and empirical work with non-profits 
from a critical management studies perspective, this article contributes a framework to deepen 
understanding of the effects of different governance assumptions and practices on the production of 
different forms and processes of accountability in a non-profit context. By addressing the 
underlying philosophical and relational issues in governance, the article frames non-profit 
governance and accountability as social and dynamic processes.  
Each governance theory is infused with assumptions of how organizations work and the 
interests of the diverse parties involved. The analysis presented suggests that unitary logics tend to 
focus the work of principals on producing policies and procedures to control the work behavior of 
agents. The purpose of internal accountability is to constrain an opportunistic and self-interested 
human nature through trustees and, subsequently, senior managers, attempting to institutionalize 
their power over others. This can result in transactional or instrumental relationships governed by 
the ‘system’ created by those at the apex of the organization. Equally, organizational members often 
prioritize compliance with the formal rules of powerful players within the external environment 
who have the authority to hold the organization to account. Accountability can thus take on a 
narrow, hierarchical form.  
In contrast, while pluralist logics do not reject the notion of control, they recognize that only 
partial control can ever be achieved. Organizations exist only through human relationships and 
whatever control is achieved is “brought about as much through processes of negotiation, 
persuasion and manipulation as through system devices like rules and official procedures” (Watson, 
2006 p. 56). Similarly, external stakeholders are seen as part of social groups where interests 
diverge. Expressive, negotiable accountability to a broad range of stakeholders is often seen as 
central to organizational mission and legitimacy within society. It has been argued that framing 
organizations as social collectives in this way is a “vital source of learning and can produce 
complex relationships of respect, trust and felt reciprocal obligation, which far exceed the purely 
instrumental orientation to action that agency theory assumes” (Roberts, 2001 p.1567).    
The four governance theories reviewed thus represent distinct schools of thought, which are 
infused with specific and sometimes opposing assumptions about the nature of work and 
organization that hold major implications for the treatment of stakeholders through producing 
particular forms and processes of accountability. My intention is not to position any particular 
approach as inherently superior to another in economic or efficiency terms; indeed, all four cases 
demonstrated a growth trajectory over the 5-year period prior to this program of research. Rather, I 
am encouraging theorists and practitioners to be aware of, and explicit about, the value systems 
underpinning work organizations and the implications of their assumptions. In the context of 
increasing calls for broad accountability, a core question for non-profit scholars and practitioners is 
the extent to which treatment of internal and external stakeholders honors the moral and social 
values projected through the organization’s social mission. 
Finally, it would be inappropriate to conclude such an article without situating my own 
position within the contested terrain presented given the importance I have placed on reflexive 
engagement with knowledge and practice constituting assumptions. My position inevitably brings 
its own limitations. Through the act of developing a framework located in a critical analysis of 
governance and accountability, I unavoidably undermine some of the schools of thought I have 
analyzed. By emphasizing the need to take into account issues of power, beliefs about the nature of 
organizing and the negotiation of social relations, I oppose the instrumentalist view of principal-
agent theories. Equally, by attempting to interrogate how notions of governance and accountability 
might variably be conceived and the ensuing implications of this variability, postmodernist 
researchers may charge that I have presented a meta-narrative. The paper does not endeavor to 
provide prescriptions of ‘how to’ govern non-profits. Rather, I hope it exposes some of the various 
views on corporate governance that exist precisely because different scholars investigate 
organizations from diverse viewpoints, cultural contexts, intellectual backgrounds and interests 
(Turnbull, 1997). 
Notes 
i It is important to note that non-profit scholars acknowledge the existence of multiple principals, 
that reside both inside and outside organizational boundaries (e.g. board members, funders, 
regulators), who possess the authority to hold agents to account (see Caers et al. 2006; Van 
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Table1: Logics, governance and accountability  
Dimension Unitary Logic Pluralist Logic 
Theoretical perspectives Agency; stewardship Stakeholder; democratic 
Organization best achieved 
through 
Systems-control approach Process-relational approach 
Scope of accountability Principal-agent 
 
Stakeholders/organizational 
and societal members 
Nature of accountability Dominance of instrumental 
accountability 
Based upon explicit and 
objectified standards or rules 
 
Expressed through adherence 
to monitoring, accounting and 
auditing, and the law 
Instrumental and expressive 
accountability 
Based upon explicit, 
objectified rules and implicit, 
subjective standards 
Involves negotiation based on 
self-perception of community 
roles and mission in addition 
to adherence to monitoring, 
accounting/ auditing and the 
law 
 


































9 trustees appointed on 
basis of faith and 
profession/skills 
Recruited through 

























8 trustees appointed on 




























13 trustees  












voted onto board by 
membership at AGM; 





















75% of board must 










iearned income includes resources received as payment for goods of services and grants that have conditions making 
them similar in economic terms to trading income  
iivoluntary income includes resources generated from gifts, donations, legacies, general grants, membership 
subscriptions 
iiiinvestment income includes resources from dividends, interest and rents 
 
 
Table 3: A typology of non-profit governance and accountability 




ensure conformance through: 
safeguarding founders’ interests; 
determining mission and purpose; 
ensuring programs, manager's 
actions and resource allocation is 
congruent with mission and 
purpose. 
Governing boards and managers 
driven by different interests within 
principal-agent relationship. 
Relationship between board and 
staff largely conducted through 
Chair-CEO. 
Primary focus is on instrumental accountability to 
resource providers. Accountability is founded upon 
principal-agent relationships and a rule-based view. 
There is a strong sense of expressive or ‘felt’ 
accountability towards organizational mission, but this is 
determined by (an often elite group of) board members. 
Conceptions of board-staff accountability: often 
transactional - based on returns for contribution made. 
Board’s focus is implementation of HRM legislation and 
formal practices, which promote upward accountability: 
the CEO holds staff to account for actions; the board 
holds CEO to account. 
Conceptions of environment-organization 
accountability: again has a primarily upward focus, 




Board members are often ‘experts’, 
who act as stewards of the 
organization's assets and improve 
performance by adding value to 
top-level decision and strategy 
making. 
Although a principal-agent 
relationship is maintained, the 
board partners and supports 
management on premise of shared 
interests. Relationship between 
board and staff largely conducted 
through Chair-CEO; there is 
sometimes Chair-CEO duality. 
Democratic 
(Pluralist logic) 
Board members are often 
lay/membership representatives 
who represent member/public 
interests; make policy; and ensure 
implementation of traditional 
democratic structures. 
(Organizational) members and the 
public have different interests. 
Organizational relations are 
conducted and control of 
management is achieved by the 
[democratic] process through which 
decisions are made. 
Adopts broad view of accountability that moves beyond 
legal requirements. Accountability is seen as something 
which is values-driven and [continually] negotiated with 
internal and external stakeholders in order to balance 
upward and downward accountability pulls.    
Conceptions of board-staff accountability: moves 
beyond legalities and formal HRM practices. Expressive 
accountability involves ensuring that organizational 
members are treated in congruence with values 
expressed in the organization's service work, structures 
and processes.    
Conceptions of environment-organization 
accountability: again moves beyond basic requirement 
for instrumental, upward accountability to powerful 
external players (funders, regulators) and takes on 
expressive forms involving self-perception of 
community role and mission. 
Stakeholder 
(Pluralist logic) 
Board is composed of stakeholder 
representatives who focus on 
balancing stakeholder needs and 
making policy. 
Stakeholders and organizations 
have different interests. 
Organizational relations and control 
of management is achieved through 
explicit focus on how specific 
stakeholder groups should exercise 
oversight and control over 
management. 
 
Table 4: Features indicating unitary logics 
Dimension Case A Case B 
Restricted face-to-
face contact between 
staff and board 
members 
“My predecessor suffered quite a 
bit from staff going to talk to 
trustees. I think he felt sometimes 
a little bit disempowered. That 
doesn’t happen so much now.” 
(CEO) 
“I don’t particularly get 
involved with the trustee side of 
things.. obviously [the 
director’s] involved with that. 
What they’re doing tends to sit 




“When we had the strategic plan 
[staff] weren’t particularly 
involved with that. We were just 
given this bit of paper, and... it all 
looked a bit gobbledy-gook to me 
and to other people.” (Staff 
Member) 
“Policy decisions are taken by 
the Board and they are enacted 
then by the director or his 
subsequent management teams.” 
(Trustee)  
Policy and strategy-
making as a means 
of control 
“The purpose of strategic 
planning is to keep the Charity on 
track to achieve our goals.. help 
us organize effectively.. so you 
don’t have a lot of conflict.. it 
reduces conflict, stops 
bickering.” (Chair)  
“We make sure they understand 
what the policies are and we 
control their work.. I particularly 
think we’ve benefited from some 
control being exercised on 
volunteers because volunteers 
can be tricky.” (Trustee) 
Conflict as 
illegitimate 
“The main challenge is bad 
relationships with staff. 
Occasionally you get someone 
“Some of the stupidity with 
volunteers made me more 
determined. The thing was to 
who’s not quite fitting and it 
causes unhappiness. The 
difficulty is it’s hard to sack 
people.. you might think 
someone’s the source of a 
problem but you can’t just say, 
you’re out. You’ve got a 
procedure to go through.” (Chair) 
wheedle out the 
troublemakers.. because it's 
like a dog that bites you 
once, it will do it again.  And 
the problem is they spread 









Table 5:  Mechanisms to reinforce hierarchical, instrumental accountability in internal 
relations 
Dimension Case A Case B 
Elevation of 





vision for the 
organization 
 
“The founder of [case A] spoke 
these words 80 years ago.. it is as 
fresh and relevant today as it was 
then.” (Org. Document)  
“If you ask anybody, particularly 
the trustees, what the vision is they 
will return to two elements of the 
trust deed [1967].. But, you’re not 
providing visionary leadership by 
simply trotting that out.” (CEO) 
“There’s been a large number of 
people from [the military] who 
were involved initially, and some of 
that has rubbed off on the way that 




policies to control 
work and ensure 
staff (agents) act 
in the best 
interests of the 
board (principals) 
“I think one challenge is getting 
our procedures up to date.. 
tightening control and ensuring 
policies are in place”.  (Chair) 
“I think we have been at pains to 
produce policies and plans for most 
things and in particular, health and 
safety and employment practice. 
That forms the framework.. when 
people come here they are told 
what their requirements are and it’s 
up to them whether they fit in with 




“Oh dear, I'm not really sure [what 
the trustees bring to the 
organization], because I always 
“It’s a fairly traditional structure 
where you have managers in charge 






board and staff 
feel that they're very distant.. I 
know we have the Staffing Sub 
Committee and we have this 
committee and that committee, but 
what they actually do?  They're a 
bit of a mystery.” (Staff member) 
is responsible to the director and 
the director then is answerable to 
the Board of Trustees.” (Trustee)  
 
Table 6: Privileging of upward, instrumental accountability in external relations 
Dimension Case A Case B 
Service users framed 





“[The change agenda] is actually 
driven by an understanding that 
people we’ve historically called 
service users are actually 
customers. So that means you 
remodel reception so it looks a 
little bit more like the Hilton than 
a prison; you remodel the drop-in 
centre so it looks more like 
Starbucks than a doss house.” 
“The board of trustees aren’t in 
the place that they should be in 
terms of service user 
representation.” (CEO) 
“We exist as a visitor attraction 
through gate money and from 
corporate business that we can 
attract.” (Trustee) 
“[The board are] highly 
professional, highly 
experienced… and they all enjoy 
the kudos of being on the board 
and that’s the basis on which we 
recruit members.” (CEO) 
External stakeholders 
who lack ability to 
bring about sanctions 
seen as an 
instrumental 
‘resource’ upon which 
the organization can 
draw to further goals 
set by upper echelons 
“[Financial] support comes from 
a variety of places.  We’ve got 
individual donors, we have a lot 
of Christians and churches 
support us. When we had a 
financial crisis I wrote to them 
and said, “we’re in trouble” and 
the response was tremendous. 
Then you’ve got the corporates. 
“We can survive within our own 
site and we see the way ahead is 
to build up the strength of what 
we have control, not on third 
party intervention.” (Trustee) 
“We have very good 
relationships with the other 
museums.. we have good 
contacts with the Parish Council 
They tend not to give money 
directly but they help in all kinds 
of ways.  They provide food, 
expertise, we get pro bono help 
from Lawyers with all our HR 
stuff it saves us a fortune. So the 
challenge is being effective and 
efficient, you know, in each of 
those areas.” (Trustee) 
and I think it’s always to the 
advantage of a business to keep 
in good contact with anybody 
who can be of help.” (Trustee) 
“It’s important to be seen to be 





Table 7: Features indicating pluralist logics 
Dimension Case C Case D 
Open face-to-face 
contact between 
staff and board 
members 
“We have an agreement that for 
every management committee 
meeting, staff write and present a 
project report. I don’t edit those, I 
pass them straight on so there is a 
direct dialogue between staff and 
trustees.” (CEO)  
“I realize how important it is that 
staff, volunteers and the board 
have really strong 
communication to each other. If 
this doesn’t happen, a director 
can have more and more power.” 
(CEO) 
Strategic decision 




“The director is absolutely fantastic, 
he allows everyone to bring their 
views to the table.. he probably sees 
it as a waste of talent if there’s so 
many people with so much ability 
sat doing their own projects and not 
feeding into the wider organization.” 
(Staff member) 
“If we start dictating to [staff], 
that’s when we’ll get a breakdown 
in terms of where they want to go, 
what they want to do and what 
they think is achievable. It has to 
be done in a way that people with 
disabilities also have the power, 




as a means of 
learning and 
development 
“We include everyone from the 
organization, irrespective of whether 
they are volunteers or national 
project managers. The organization 
really takes into consideration the 
views and perspectives of people 
who work for it. I don’t think I’d 
“There wouldn’t be any point in 
doing a [strategic] plan without 
everybody.. there’s no interest 
there if you’re not involved, it 
doesn’t mean anything, it’s just 
another piece of paper. If the 
involvement is there.. there is 
work for an organization that 
didn’t.” (Staff member) 
ownership.” (Staff member) 
Conflict as 
inevitable and a 
source of 
creativity 
“There are lots of strong characters 
in the organization. It’s very 
difficult to get away with a half-
baked idea.. almost everything you 
say, someone’s going to say, oh 
really, and why do you think that?  
All that excites me.. it’s quite 
creative and… open, it’s always a 
challenge and you’ve got to be on 
your toes.” (Staff member) 
“Because we go about changing 
things outside of the organization, 
it’s really important that we 
change things within the 
organization. It’s trying to work 
with people so the culture in the 
organization is one where people 
can.. say if they’re not happy 




Table 8: Mechanisms to reinforce felt, expressive accountability in internal relations 
Dimension Case C Case D 
Deliberate 
opportunities to 
test and challenge 




“The trustees bring a lot of 
expertise.  They also act as our.. 
gatekeeper if you like.  If we come 
up with silly ideas they will tend to 
be the people who knock them 
back.  But they're such an 
incredibly intelligent bunch that 
sometimes they'll come up with 
things, problems in your strategic 
approach that you'd never even 
contemplated.  And I think that's 
really key.” (Staff member) 
“[The team meeting is] generally 
chaired by people with learning 
disabilities and we have an agenda 
up for about a week before so 
anyone can write whatever they 
want on it. It's trying to work with 
people so the culture in the 
organization and the atmosphere is 
one where people can.. it's really 
important to argue.. and say if 
they're not happy about things. It’s 
about trying to get people to take 







in service work  
“Despite the organization having a 
lot of disparate projects, internally 
we very much adopt a partnership 
approach. We have bi-monthly 
staff meetings where and that 
works very well. We have a 
knowledge management meeting 
where we focus on the 
organization’s strategic aims and 
how our projects align with that to 
“I was first attracted to work here 
because it is a political organization 
and I believe in what they’re doing 
towards rights for people with 
disabilities.  I like the way it works 
‘cause it works differently from 
other organizations.. it’s 
empowering to people. We employ 
disabled and non-disabled people 
who are paired as co-workers and 
meet stakeholders needs.” (Staff 
member) 





and staff to build 
virtuous circle of 
openness and 
engagement  
“Certainly in the early days 
when the staff was smaller 
things would informally 
definitely have been discussed 
and chewed round. As an 
organization gets larger and 
staff are dispersed, it actually 
then becomes practically more 
difficult to do that unless you 
make a specific decision.” 
(Trustee) 
“When the trustees are having a 
board meeting, they come early 
and we meet over lunch and its 
open for us to discuss things with 
them.  It wouldn’t be a problem to 
say “look I’m concerned about his 
or that”. It makes the board less 
detached from the workers on the 
ground, because they’re not sat up 
in this hierarchy.  I don’t feel like 
its all going on and I’m not 
contributing.. that out of control 
feeling.. and decisions are just 
being made.  I feel that if it came to 
it, I could walk in there [the board 
meeting] and say “this isn’t ok”. I 
wouldn’t feel frightened to do that 
or intimidated.” (Staff member) 
 
 
Table 9: Privileging of expressive, values-based accountability in external relations 
Dimension Case C Case D 




activities as a source 
of legitimacy  
“There’s a challenge in 
maintaining enough credibility for 
grant giving trusts to fund us.. that 
credibility is gained from 
delivering services to 
organizations that are in our field.  
So we need to be seen to be doing 
our core duties. The other element 
of our work is reliant on how 
good our partnerships are with 
other agencies in the criminal 
justice sector. So we need to 
maintain our strategic partnerships 
and also be seen as an 
organization that isn’t necessarily 
biased, but is a just organization.  
That we will always work in 
terms of the interests of 
offenders.” (Staff member) 
“Because we’re an advocacy 
organization not a service provider, 
what we tend to do is focus on what 
learning disabled people tell us are 
issues for them and they are usually 
learning disabled people involved 
with the organization as volunteers 
or workers but also within the 
national arena, we respond to and 
influence policy initiatives. So we 
respond in both ways, upwards in 
relation to what learning disabled 
people tell us are issues and I guess 
downwards in terms of what policy 
initiatives are coming out and how 
we can ensure that learning 
disabled people are involved in 




developed on basis 
of congruence of 
values and politics 
to ensure 
organization acts in 
best interests of 
social mission  
“There was a small grant-giving 
trust.. and they were very keen to 
merge with us and bring their 
money with them. The board 
decided not to pursue that. 
There’s been a number of merger 
approaches, three in fact. The two 
that weren’t accepted; one was, in 
all honesty, a genuine lack of trust 
in the organization proposing the 
merge, the other due to a feeling 
that it just didn’t fit.” (CEO)   
“There’s some voluntary 
organizations we wouldn’t work 
with.  Because we feel that they 
would overtake our politics [name 
of leading national charity] being 
one of them.  We've got some 
funding applications that we've 
done jointly with other 
organizations.. in fact we're doing 
one with [a local] University that's 
really successful. The reason is 
because it's with the Disabilities 
Unit.  So the person we're working 
with there, who runs it, who's a 





to present adverse 
effects on less 
powerful 
stakeholders  
“We won’t accept government 
funds for core funding. It all 
comes from grant-giving trusts, 
which can be a bit strained but it 
gives us the ability to lobby as an 
organization. It’s definitely a 
value-based decision, an ethical 
decision.” (Staff member) 
“We’re pretty clear about who we 
are and what we are and that’s part 
and parcel of the bid so.. people 
will give us money on the basis of 
that but.. we don’t tend to make any 




Figure 1: Data Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
